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ABSTRACT

Although the World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of
the most significant international institutions, its function,
domain, and legitimacy are still heavily contested. The Author
examines the history of the founding of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO's predecessor, to see
what history reveals about the role that GATT was originally
expected to fulfill. The Author's interpretiveexamination shows
that GATT's founders recognized that trade policy must be
internationalizedin order to give one country an opportunity to
participatein the policy-making of other countries; otherwise, a
county can impose costs on other countries without
representation from those countries. This review therefore
supports the vision of the WTO as an institution of international
participatory democracy; suggests that the WTO is a political,
not just an economic institution;and rebuts the notion that the
domain of the WTO is limited to helping countries overcome
protectionist interests at home.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHY THE HISTORICAL RECORD MATTERS

Although the World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the
most important international economic institutions, its function,
domain, and legitimacy are still heavily contested. The WTO's role as
a multilateral institution that oversees the international trading
system is clear, but it is not at all clear why an international
organization is needed to oversee national trade policy' or what the
scope and penetration of that oversight should be. 2 The WTO is under
constant academic and popular scrutiny in an effort to determine the
rationale for its work and to assess, given that rationale, the borders
3
and reach of its work.

1.
To economists an international organization to oversee national tariff policy
is paradoxical because free trade ought to be the policy chosen by each country on its
own. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J.
ECON. LIT. 113 (1997). Because border restrictions hurt consumers more than they help
producers or generate revenue, unilateral "disarmament" of barriers to trade ought to
occur spontaneously, without the need for an international organization or
negotiations, as countries follow their own self-interest. See generally CHARLES P.
KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17 (5th ed. 1973); PAUL R. KRUGMAN &
MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, THEORY AND POLICY 1-159 (2000);
Alan 0. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International
Trade Policy, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 49 (1998).
2.
The body of work that seeks to define how various "non-trade subject
matter" ought to be treated within the WTO is large and growing, encompassing
subjects as diverse as human rights and corruption. See generally, Symposium: The
Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 1 (2002).
3.
Recent articles discussing the nature of the WTO's mandate include: Joel P.
Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth and
Development?, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 285 (2003); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights
and the Law of the World Trade Organization, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 241 (2003); Andras
Sajo, Socioeconomic Rights and the InternationalEconomic Order, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
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This Article examines the history of the founding of the WTO's
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in
the 1940s to see what light history sheds on how to understand the
WTO and its function. The connection between GATT and the
founding of the WTO is direct, albeit separated by forty-five years,
because the WTO takes the place of the organization that was
envisioned when GATT was signed. 4 Although GATT's history has
been well documented in other works, both contemporaneously 5 and
retrospectively,6 few works ask how history can aid understanding
the function and domain of GATT, and its successor, the WTO. That
interpretive task is undertaken in this Article.
The main contours of the interpretation advanced in this Article
will not surprise informed readers. GATT's founding recognized that
tariffs are a particularly troublesome source of economic friction
between countries. 7 Tariffs came to be understood as a way by which
the problems of one country were exported to, and visited upon, other
countries-a form of economic aggression akin to war. Because a tariff
is essentially a tax on the opportunities of foreign producers, it is a
form of taxation without representation-a tax on foreign producers
over which the foreign producers have no say. Tariffs therefore
inevitably invite retaliation because retaliation through government-

& POL. 221 (2002); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights-Past,
Present, and Future, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 797 (2003).
4.
The founding of the WTO is the culmination of the original vision of GATT's
founders. After World War II, it was envisioned that countries would form the
International Trade Organization (ITO) to oversee a wide variety of economic relations.
Countries negotiated a set of rules, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, that
would govern tariff negotiations while the ITO was being established, and it was
contemplated that those rules would later be folded into the mandate of the ITO. When
the ITO failed to be implemented, the agreement covering tariff negotiations continued,
albeit without a formal organizational structure or accepted legal status. An informal
organization was built to administer the negotiations, and that organization came to be
called GATT, a name that until 1994 referred to both the rules for the trading system
and the organization that sponsored the negotiations and facilitated dispute resolution.
GATT the organization was then subsumed into the World Trade Organization when
the WTO was established and given official legal status following the Uruguay Round
of negotiations in 1994. The brief history of the ITO is recounted in JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). On the ITO, see CLAIR WILCOX, A
CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949) [hereinafter WILCOX, TRADE CHARTER]; William
Diebold, The End of the ITO, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 16 (1952).
5.

WILCOX, TRADE CHARTER, supra note 4.

6.
RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW § 1-4(d)-(e)(2) (1998);
RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE (1980)
[hereinafter GARDNER, STERLING DIPLOMACY]; DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER
FIRE (2002) [hereinafter IRWIN, UNDER FIRE]; JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 30-35 (1989);
THOMAS ZEILER, FREE TRADE, FREE WORLD: THE ADVENT OF GATT (1999); Douglas A.

Irwin, The GATT in HistoricalPerspective, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1995).
7.
See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
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imposed tariffs is the only "voice" that foreign producers have to
counter foreign taxation. The historical record makes it clear that an
international institution was understood to be needed to forestall
such aggression by providing a forum in which one country could
voice its concerns about the policies of another country. 8 Thus, history
shows that GATT's founding was driven by the understanding that
every country had an interest in the tariff policies of other countries
and therefore an interest in having a right to participate in the
making of those policies.
Although not surprising, this historical interpretation is
important for two reasons. First, it suggests that the rationale for the
founding of GATT was political, not economic. The gains expected
from GATT were not the familiar gains of trade and specialization
that result in economic interdependence. Instead, the gains were to
come from participatory lawmaking and political interdependence.
Second, it suggests that GATT was not founded out of a need to
overcome protectionist interests at home--or to set up an
international organization to counter domestic protectionist
interests-but out of a need to counter protectionist interests abroad.
GATT founders understood that a tariff policy that meets domestic
objectives within a country may be objectionable not because it is bad
for the country imposing the tariff, but because of its effect on
producers in other countries.
This Article concludes that the historical account of the origins of
GATT (and through GATT, the WTO) undercuts one common
contemporary interpretation of the scope and function of the
WTO-namely, the notion that GATT was established to help
countries suppress the special interests that seek to influence trade
policy. 9 GATT was not founded to help a country achieve a more
efficient economy by overcoming protectionist sentiment at home or to
benefit consumers by lowering tariffs. That was the effect of GATTand a most salubrious one at that-but the purpose of GATT was to

8.
9.

See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
The notion that GATT was designed to fight special interests in the

domestic economy is emphasized in JAN TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN

DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 61-70 (1985); Robert E. Hudec, "Circumventing"Democracy:
The PoliticalMorality of Trade Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311 (1993);
John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 511 (2000); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995) (discussing
models that can aid interpretation of WTO treaties, including the Efficient Market
Model, which relies on this vision). Similar arguments have been made in the context
of European Constitutionalism by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. See ERNST-ULRICH
PETERSMANN,

CONSTITUTIONAL

FUNCTIONS

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROBLEMS

OF

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991) (discussing the constitutional function of trade
laws).
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allow a country to influence the policy of foreign countries that
reduced opportunities for a country's exporters-what this author has
called the "participatory vision." 10 GATT was founded by countries
that were outward-looking, not inward-looking.
Before elaborating on these claims, the interpretive puzzle
underlying this study should be clarified. Free trade across borders is
in all consumers' interest because they get better products at better
prices. Protectionism in the form of tariff or non-tariff barriers can be
understood in one of two ways. Protectionism may result because
special interests (i.e., producers and workers who compete against
imports) capture the political process in order to divert some of the
consumer value to themselves. Protectionism may also result because
policymakers decide to advance some non-efficiency interests above
the consumer interest. Neither basis for understanding why countries
restrict trade has an a priori claim over the other; tariff barriers can
be explained on the basis of political failures or because efficiency is
sacrificed in the name of non-efficiency values.
The reasons that countries resort to reciprocal commitments to
reduce tariffs are also ambiguous. Naturally, any country wants to
break down foreign barriers to trade. A country benefits absolutely
when a foreign country reduces its trade barriers, since such a policy
makes a country's exports more valuable (by removing a barrier that
would reduce demand). The motivation for reciprocal negotiations,
however, is not so clear. 1 In reciprocal negotiations a country lowers
its tariffs to induce a reciprocating country to lower its tariffs. This
can be understood in two ways: first, as an attempt to help its
producers gain access to the foreign market as an end in itself; or,
alternatively, as an effort to strengthen the political power of a
country's exporters so that the exporters can present a political

10.
I have written about this central function of the WTO in earlier work. See
Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Visions of The World Trade Organization,24 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 1 (2003).
11.
Economists Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger have helpfully modeled the
dilemma by recognizing that tariffs may reflect non-efficiency, distributional concerns
that arise when a country determines its tariff policy-what they call the "political
economy approach to trade agreements." Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The
Economics of the World Trading System 3 (2002). Such tariffs create an externality
(which they call a terms of trade externality) because the tariffs, although appropriate
for the domestic market (from the political economy perspective), impose costs on
foreigners. Concerns over market access to foreign markets can then be understood as
equivalent to the terms of trade externality, making to possible to reconcile the
political perspective of this article (concern over foreign market access) with the
economic perspective (concern over the terms of trade externalities). Id. at 5, 35.
Reciprocal trade agreements can then be understood as either an attempt to overcome
the distributional interests that impair the efficiency of the market imposing the
tariffs, or as a way of dealing with the externalities that countries impose on each other
through their tariffs.
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counterweight to the special-interest producers that seek protection
from competition. Again, when a country reduces its tariff barriers in
order to get another country to reduce its tariff barriers, there is no a
priori basis for determining whether the purpose was to help
exporters as exporters or to help exporters as a way of overcoming
protectionist special-interest objections to free trade.
Because neither competing explanation for tariffs or negotiations
to break down tariffs has an a priori claim to be recognized as
accurate, no conclusions can be drawn about why tariffs have come
down in the context of reciprocal negotiations from the bare fact that
they have come down. The United States moved from a policy of
protectionism to a policy supporting bilateral and multilateral tariff
reductions, but there is no a priori reason to attribute that change to
either of the competing explanations.
In other words, the GATT/WTO system can be understood in one
of two ways. One can understand the tariff negotiations that are at
the heart of the GATT/WTO system as, on the one hand, an attempt
by countries to use the interests of their export industries to overcome
the special interests that support protectionist policies or, on the
other hand, as an attempt to open new markets for export industries
as an end in itself, with the benefits to the consumer (which come
when a foreign country reduces its tariffs) as a beneficial by-product
of that goal. Because a reduction in protectionism occurs under either
causal account, the successful negotiation of lower tariffs in a
multilateral round achieves both goals and is consistent with either
motivation.
One might ask, of course, why it is important to understand the
reason for engaging in reciprocal tariff reductions. After all, the
outcome has two jointly produced results-it enhances the welfare of
domestic consumers by reducing protectionism, and it enhances the
welfare of domestic exporting producers. It should not matter which
of these outcomes is the goal of the enterprise and which is the
beneficial by-product of the enterprise. Why does one care which is
the tail and which is the dog?
The answer is important because if the historical purpose of the
GATT/WTO system is only to allow countries to use the interests of
exporting producers to defeat the special interests that sought
protectionism, then the WTO's function and legitimacy, at least from
the historical standpoint, can be understood in a very narrow way.
Under that view, the rationale underlying the GATT/WTO system
would explain the extension of the GATT/WTO domain only to
situations in which a country needed to defeat the special interests
that would otherwise capture the political process and secure tariff
and non-tariff barriers for themselves. This would be a limited ambit
of operation, leaving the WTO out of fields such as intellectual
property, labor, and environmental rights. By contrast, if the
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historical rationale for reciprocal trade agreements is to open foreign
markets as an end in itself, then that rationale can easily justify
extension beyond the ambit of trade policies and also support a vision
of the WTO that would allow it to provide a forum for negotiations or
a far wider range of issues, potentially encompassing any domain in
which the policy of one country hurts the interests of another country.
This latter view opens up a far wider domain for the WTO, providing
support for the WTO's expansion into intellectual property rights and
a rationale for its expansion into other forms of rights.
The analysis in this Article therefore has a significant effect on
how to understand the WTO-its function, its legitimacy, and its
domain. It suggests that the WTO's legitimacy lies in its ability to
allow one country to have a voice concerning the harmful policies of
other countries. It suggests that the WTO's role as a negotiating
forum need not be limited to the subject of tariffs and other tradedistorting measures. And it suggests that the domain of the WTO
need not be limited to trade but can conceivably expand to any
situation in which one country's policy adversely affects the wellbeing of people in other countries.
These matters are explored in this Article as follows. In Part II, a
brief overview of the events that lead to the founding of GATT is
provided. This provides the context in which the later, interpretive
discussion takes place. This discussion highlights the increased
internationalization of tariff policy in Europe in the nineteenth
century, the economic isolation and economic nationalism of the
United States before 1934, and the eventual emergence of the United
States to lead internationalization after World War II. Part III
analyzes the transformative event in the United States that
symbolized the shift from isolation to internationalization-the
passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934.
Understanding how this transformation shifted United States trade
policy from the domestic to the international sphere is an important
part of understanding the ideological shift that led eventually to the
establishment of GATT.
In Part IV of the Article, the subsequent evolution in United
States trade policy is outlined. Here the story of the United States
emerging from the Great Depression and World War II as the fulcrum
for the establishment of the United Nations and other international
institutions is conjoined with another development. The Keynesian
revolution taught countries, especially the United States, that they
could address full employment objectives by manipulating aggregate
demand rather than by working to improve demand in particular
industries. The effect of the Keynesian revolution was to liberate
tariff policy from its prior moorings, which had justified tariffs and
tariff policy by the need to ensure jobs. After the Keynesian
revolution, the goal of creating jobs could be relegated to macro-
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economic policy, which removed any pretense that tariffs were a
necessary part of a program for achieving full employment. As a
result, the transfer of trade policy from the domestic to the
international sphere was complete.

II. A

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TRADE INTERNATIONALIZATION

Although GATT's founding was proximately the result of
American leadership during the Great Depression and World War II,
the movement to internationalize tariff policy began in Europe, for it
was in Europe that the international repercussions of tariff policy
were first understood.
The creation of the Zollvereign among the German states 12 and
analogous nation building in Italy were, of course, early forerunners
of tariff cooperation across discrete political boundaries. Even after
the modern nation-states of Europe emerged, however, the size and
proximity of European nations quickly made cooperation across
boundaries important for national prosperity. At the end of the
nineteenth century, European nations therefore led the movement
toward harmonization and globalization-a fact reflected not only in
treaties on matters such as intellectual property, communications,
transportation, and standards 13 but also in coordination of tariff
policy. 14 According to one authority:
The European states maintained among themselves a commercial
treaty system in which tariffs were contractually bound for long
periods, usually ten years. The bilateral treaties were interlinked by
the unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) clause contained in each.
Through the unconditional MFN clause, each of the treaty partners
pledges to grant the other, freely-indeed automatically-any privilege
or favor in commercial matters that it has hitherto granted or may
subsequently grant to any third country. The MFN clause linked the
bilateral treaties into a system in which a change in any country's

12.
The Zollvereign were the customs unions that broke down the economic
barriers between German principalities. See generally WILLIAM 0. HENDERSON, THE
ZOLLVEREIGN (1939); ARNOLD H. PRICE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE ZOLLVEREIGN: A
STUDY OF THE IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS LEADING TO GERMAN ECONOMIC UNIFICATION

BETWEEN 1815 AND 1833 (1949); EMMANUEL N. ROUSSAKIS, FRIEDRICH LIST, THE
ZOLLVEREIGN, AND THE UNITING OF EUROPE (1968).
13.
For historical accounts of European internationalism in the context of PreWorld War I globalization, see F.B. SAYRE, EXPERIMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION (1919); L.S. WOOLF, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1916).
14.
See WENDY A. BRUSSE, TARIFFS, TRADE, AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION,
1947-1957, FROM STUDY GROUP TO COMMON MARKET 1-10 (1997); JOHN M. HOBSON,
THE WEALTH OF STATES: A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1997); A.G. HOPKINS, GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY
(2002); JOHN A. KROLL, CLOSURE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, THE IMPACT ON
STRATEGY, BLOCS, AND EMPIRES (1995).
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import policy was bound to affect all its trading partners. In practice
15
this meant that tariff changes required negotiation.

Europe's search for mechanisms of international cooperation
continued after World War I through the League of Nations, whose
16
members sought mechanisms for cooperation on tariff policy.
Although a series of meetings and conferences were unsuccessful at
establishing a workable framework for tariff negotiations, League
conferences demonstrated the common understanding of League
members that national tariff policies were a matter of international,
not merely national, interest.
In these early efforts at tariff and economic negotiations the
United States was largely an observer, for not only had the United
States abstained from the entire project of the League, but during
this period, as before, the United States thought of tariff policy as a
domestic, not international, matter. From its inception, the United
States was a highly protectionist country; indeed, tariffs continually
increased through 1935, except for two periods. 17 Tariffs were set
directly by Congress; they were higher under Republican Congresses
than under Democratic Congresses, but the debate was always about
the basis and degree of protection, not whether to have it. The zenith
of U.S. protectionism-actually the straw that broke the back of
protectionism-came in 1930 when, in the teeth of the Great
Depression, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Act, a veritable orgy
of unpatterned and unprincipled tariff increases that were the
highest in the history of the United States.' 8 It is ironic that the

15.
TUMLIR, supra note 9, at 19-20. It is of interest that European countries
delegated negotiating authority to the executive, not only because this was a practical
necessity if tariffs were to be negotiated, but also because the most favored nations
requirement, by requiring that tariff reductions be offered to all treaty partners, were a
natural limitation on the exercise of the negotiating power.
16.
WILCOX, TRADE CHARTER, supra note 4, at 5-8 (summarizing the following
main conferences: 1922 Brussels convention on monetary and fiscal policy, failed Genoa
conference of 1922, simplification of customs formalities at a Geneva conference in
1923, World Economic Conference in 1927, Geneva conference of 1927, and conferences
of February and March 1930). See generally ANTHONY M. ENDRES & GRANT A.
FLEMING, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC POLICY,
1919-1950 105-108 (2002) ("Geneva economists remained consistent advocates of free
trade."); MARTIN HILL, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS: A SURVEY OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS EXPERIENCE (1946).
17.
Tariffs declined slightly from 1832 to the beginning of the Civil War and
from 1913 until 1922. RAYMOND A. BAUER ET AL., AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC
POLICY: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE 11 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter BAUER ET AL.,
BUSINESS AND POLICY]. Tariffs during the pre-Civil war period were highly influenced
by the need to find compromises between the North (which generally favored
protectionism) and the South (which disparaged protectionism as it sought
international markets for its agricultural products).
18.
See IRWIN, UNDER FIRE, supra note 6, at 150 ("From the Morrill tariff of
1861 until 1930, [yielding to protectionist interests] was the standard way of doing
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Smoot-Hawley legislation was passed in May 1930, just two months
after major countries in the League of Nations had adopted a
convention calling for a moratorium on tariff increases 19 and just six
months before League members were to implement a protocol for a
round a tariff negotiations. 20 The effect of Smoot-Hawley was
immediate and devastating. The League of Nations conference was
scuttled, and one by one countries began to react to Smoot-Hawley
and the global depression by raising their own tariffs. 21 Economic war
had broken out.

business [for Congress]. Yet the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 was longer, more complex,
more controversial, and more openly the product of political games than the previous
tariff legislation. Congress reopened the tariff issue in 1929 in order to help farmers
from the declining crop prices, but the process spun out of control as other industries
got into the act and demanded higher tariffs as well."). The classic study of the political
process that led to Smoot-Hawley is E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND
THE TARIFF (1935) [hereinafter SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS AND PRESSURES]. A
distinctive and somewhat more nuanced view is contained in Barry Eichengreen, The
Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 12 RES. IN ECON. HIST. 1 (1989). See also
ROBERT A. PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
1929-1976 70, 80 (1980) [hereinafter PASTOR, CONGRESS AND ECONOMIC POLICY]

(criticizing Schattschneider for over-reliance on committee hearings, to the exclusion of
mark-up sessions, and pointing out the partisan nature of the battle and Hoover's
capitulation to the logrolling).
19.
The United States did not attend the conference at which this pledge was
made, and only eleven of the twenty-seven countries that attended agreed to the
pledge. CHARLES KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD
[hereinafter KINDLEBERGER, DEPRESSION].

IN DEPRESSION,

1929-1939

(1975)

20.
Id. at 7-8.
21.
Clair Wilcox, a close observer of the trends, presented the consensus view of
the effect of Smoot-Hawley: In the few months following its passage,
[t]ariffs were raised in Canada, Cuba, France, Mexico, Italy, Spain, Australia,
and New Zealand. Quantitative restrictions and exchange controls had been
imposed by twenty-six countries by the end of 1931. The United Kingdom
abandoned free trade and adopted a general tariff in February 1931. The
nations of the British Commonwealth, meeting in Ottawa the following
summer, established the system of imperial [tariff] preferences.
WILCOX, TRADE CHARTER, supra note 4, at 8. The League of Nations itself reported that
Smoot-Hawley was "the signal for an outburst of tariff-making activity in other
countries, partly as least by way of reprisals." LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC
SURVEY (1933). The correlation between Smoot-Hawley and retaliation by other
countries does not itself prove that Smoot-Hawley was the mechanism that caused the
retaliation. After all, other countries were also feeling the effects of the Great
Depression, and that may have been an independent reason for them to shrink into
isolationism. The causal mechanism is supported by historical studies; see, e.g., JOSEPH
M. JONES, TARIFF RETALIATION: REPERCUSSIONS OF THE HAWLEY-SMOOT BILL (1934)-

although many claim that Jones overemphasizes the causal relationship. See Barry
Eichengreen, The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, in RESEARCH IN
ECONOMIC HISTORY 12 (Roger Ransom ed., 1989); KINDLEBERGER, DEPRESSION, supra
note 19, at 132 (noting difficulty of disengaging "reason from excuse"); Anthony
O'Brien, Smoot-Hawley Tariff, at http://www.eh.net/encyclopedia/obrien.hawleysmoot.tariff.php. Douglas Irwin suggests that Smoot-Hawley had the indirect effect of
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The effect, of course, was to make all countries worse off and to
deepen the Great Depression by reducing the buying power of
consumers, whose income was previously reduced by already-existing
depressed economic conditions. 2 2 Countries thought that they could
export a little unemployment by foisting it off on foreigners, but the
collective consequence of the multilateral tariff increases was to
cripple demand for goods from any country. This economic war was
fought on many fronts, for this was the era of beggar-thy-neighbor
policies; as Claire Wilcox described it:
Exports were forced; imports were curtailed. All of the weapons of
commercial warfare were brought to play; currencies were depreciated,
exports subsidized, tariffs raised, exchange controlled, quotas imposed,
and discrimination practiced through preferential systems and barter
deals. Each nation tried to sell much and buy little. A vicious
23
restrictionism produced a further deterioration in world trade.

From this experience, the world learned a valuable lesson. When
the policy of one country adversely affects another, the other country
is likely to take retaliatory action because retaliation is a potent way
by which a form of redress may be sought. Although
counterproductive (because it leaves both countries worse off and
leads to counter-retaliation), in the absence of any other mechanism
for objecting to the harmful policy of another country, retaliation is a
natural political reaction.
It was not difficult for people to connect the economic warfare
that characterized the Great Depression with the hostilities of World
War II, finding the peacetime economic rivalry to be a contributing
factor to the War. 24 Accordingly, when Allied leaders met during the
War to envision a post-War world that would give them the political
and economic security they had barely known in their lifetimes, they

signaling "a breakdown in policy discipline and triggered tariff increases as other
countries followed the United States example." Douglas A. Irwin, From Smoot-Hawley
to Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing Course of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1930s, in
THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE

TWENTIETH CENTURY 337 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter IRWIN,
SMOOT-HAWLEY TO RTAA].

22.
Douglas Irwin states the consensus view when he says that Smoot-Hawley
"was almost surely not responsible for causing the Great Depression." Nor was Smoot
Hawley entirely responsible for the collapse in trade. Id. at 336-37. The combined
impact of the global depression and new tariff barriers, however, was dramatic. For
example, United States exports decreased from $5 billion in the years of the late 1920s
to $1.5 billion in 1932. WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR., NEW DIRECTIONS IN OUR TRADE POLICY

6 (1941) [hereinafter DIEBOLD, NEW DIRECTIONS].
23.
WILCOX, TRADE CHARTER, supra note 4, at 8-9. For a detailed account of the
use of monetary policy and devalued exchange rate during this period, see BARRY
EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING
GLOBALIZING CAPITAL].

24.

CAPITAL

72-92

(1996)

See infra text accompanying notes 72-79.

[hereinafter

EICHENGREEN,
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envisioned not only an institution for national security (the United
Nations) but also institutions for economic security-specifically, the
Bretton Woods institutions that emerged later as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (later the World Bank), 25 and the proposed
International Trade Organization (ITO). 26 The IMF was to ensure
against economic warfare through competitive devaluations; the
World Bank was to provide loans for redevelopment after the War;
and the ITO was to monitor other economic and social relations
between countries. The ITO was scuttled when the U.S. Congress was
seized with another bout of isolationism, 2 7 but the idea of multilateral
tariff negotiations prevailed. GATT soon emerged as an organization
that grew naturally from the needs of the multilateral negotiations,
and its strength grew as the international trading system flourished
in the face of the Cold War.
When Allied leaders were searching for a model to guide the
multilateral tariff negotiations, they did not have to look far. In the
midst of the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration had
reversed United States tariff policy and negotiated bilateral and
multilateral reductions in tariffs in order to find a way out of the
Depression. The vehicle for this new policy was the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934,28 in which Congress temporarily
surrendered its power to set tariffs and granted the President the
power (for three years) to lower U.S. tariffs when the reduction was
matched by a reciprocal reduction of another country. Under this
power, the United States rejoined the world trade community,
reignited the League's cooperative attempts, and initiated a series of
negotiations intended to lower tariffs on a wide range of goods from a
wide range of countries. Although the tariff reductions before World
War II were modest, the process was reignited after World War II. In
effect, the London conference, planned for 1930 under the auspices of
the League of Nations, was reconvened after the interruption of the
Great Depression and World War II-this time at the call of the
United States. One can understand the founding of GATT, then, as a
function of growing internationalization that started in the prior

25.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE (Bretton Woods, N.H., July
1-22, 1944); THE BRETTON WOODS - GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER
FIFTY YEARS (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996); INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILIZATION: A
SYMPOSIUM (Murray Shields ed., 1944); GEORGE SCHILD ET AL., AMERICAN ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL POST-WAR PLANNING IN THE SUMMER OF 1944 (1945).

26.
27.
28.
(1934).

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
An Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 474, § 350(a), 73 Stat. 943
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century, with leadership provided when the United States emerged
29
from its isolationism in the middle of the twentieth century.
Two pivotal events fueled U.S. leadership: the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act and the Keynesian revolution.

III.

THE U.S. TRANSFORMATION: THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
ACT OF 1934

The transformation from the protectionism of the Smoot-Hawley
Act of 1930 to the expansionist philosophy of the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934 (RTAA) turned the United States from an
inward-looking, isolationist, and protectionist country into one
focused both on international economic affairs and on exports. In the
process, the United States took the leadership role in international
economic policy. How should this transforming event be understood
30
and interpreted?
The transformation in U.S. trade policy was not merely a natural
offshoot of the larger U.S. transformation from isolationism to
internationalism; it was, more precisely, a transformation in the way
31
that tariff policy was perceived. As other commentators have noted,
and as is shown below, tariff policy was previously perceived to be a
matter of domestic concern only. Tariff policy took into account and

29.
Professors Bagwell and Staiger, in their account of United States
leadership, emphasize the prior attempts at policy coordination between countries
suffered because countries could not find the successor formula for organizing such
coordination. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 11, at 45. As they point out, the
RTAA provided that framework, while post-war leadership by the United States made
the framework on appealing to use. See also CAROLYN RHODES, Reciprocity, U.S. Trade
Policy, and the GATT Regime 56 (1993).
30.
This was not, of course, a transformation that occurred over a four year
period only, for the seeds of the transformation date back to the earlier part of the
century, when President Wilson's internationalism following World War I
encompassed, among other things, a call for multilateral reductions in trade barriers.
See HAMILTON FOLEY, WOODROW WILSON'S CASE FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 174-76
(1923). The seeds sown by Wilson were suppressed in the isolationism of the 1920s but
finally bore fruit under Roosevelt and Truman. John Maynard Keynes identified
Wilson's failure as a lack of implementation plans:
When it came to practice, his ideas were nebulous and incomplete. He had no
plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of
life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House ....
[H]e could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of Europe.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ESSAYS IN BIOGRAPHY 21-22 (1951).

31.
See EDWARD KAPLAN, AMERICAN TRADE POLICY, 1923-1995 46 (1996)
[hereinafter KAPLAN, TRADE POLICY]; STEPHANIE ANN LENWAY, THE POLITICS OF
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE: PROTECTION, EXPANSION, AND ESCAPE 21
(1985) [hereinafter LENWAY, TRADE POLITICS].
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responded to domestic concerns, but no attention was paid to the
effect of tariffs on foreigners or to the international consequences of
tariffs. 32 The RTAA transformed U.S. trade policy by reflecting a new
understanding-that tariffs have external, international implications.
Tariffs invite or encourage retaliation; they are a source of friction
between countries; and they are bad for U.S. citizens because they are
bad for foreigners. This transformation is the foundational story
behind the establishment of GATT.
This transformation can be understood symbolically, even before
it is traced historically, in the words and thoughts of the principal
architect of this transformation, Cordell Hull. His distinguished
career of public service spanned five decades and culminated in his
service as Roosevelt's Secretary of State in the 1930s. Cordell Hull
always favored free trade, but his reasons for favoring free trade
shifted during the course of his career. As he wrote:
The year 1916 is a milestone in my political thinking. Then for the first
time I enlarged my views on trade and tariffs from the national to the
international theater. Hitherto I had fought hard for lower tariffs,
largely because of their immediate domestic effect. I believed that high
tariffs meant a higher cost of living for American citizens. They assisted
in building up monopolies and trusts. By cutting down the sales by
other countries to us, they also cut down the purchase by other
countries from us.
But toward 1916 I embraced the philosophy I carried throughout my
twelve years as Secretary of State, into the Trade Agreements, into
numerous speeches and statements addressed to this country and to
the world. From then on, to me, unhampered trade dovetailed with
peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition,
with war. Though realizing that many other factors were involved, I
reasoned that, if we could get a freer flow of trade-freer in the sense of
fewer discriminations and obstructions-so that one country would not
be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of all countries
might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds
33
war, we might have a reasonable chance for lasting peace.

32.

Richard Gardner has noted that the United States followed:

a political system which tended to subordinate national to local interests and,
as a corollary of this, international considerations to consideration of a
domestic character. The bargaining among sectional groups, so essential a part
of the American legislative process, often produced unfortunate results when it
came to matters affecting the relations of the United States with the rest of the
world.
GARDNER, STERLING DIPLOMACY, supra note 6, at 3.
33.
CORDELL HULL, MEMOIRS 81 (1948) [hereinafter HULL MEMOIRS]. As early
as 1916, Hull, then a Congressman, proposed, on the floor of the House of
Representatives, a series of negotiations to consider "all international trade methods,
practices, and policies which, in their effects are calculated to create destructive
commercial controversies or bitter economic wars, and to formulate agreements with
respect thereto ..
" Id. at 82. A careful analysis of Hull's thinking on trade issues is

2004]

Hull's

THE WTO AND PARTICIPA TORY DEMOCRACY

transformation

was

not

a

transformation

from

protectionism to free trade but a transformation in the reasons why
he favored free trade. Early in his career, Hull favored low tariffs
because he understood the economic case for free trade, which is
essentially a domestic case-that free trade is beneficial for
consumers and is good for the domestic economy. 34 He understood
that lower tariffs would, by lowering prices, increase national wealth
by freeing consumer resources for other uses. 35 This is a purely
domestic rationale, grounded on purely domestic considerations, and
built on the notion that the advantage of free trade to a country's
36
consumers always outweighs the disadvantages to its producers.
Hull's personal transformation was to realize that the value of free
trade is not just domestic and is not just in consumer purchasing
power. 37 Free trade removed an unnecessary irritant in the
relationship between countries by removing a policy that adversely
affected producers in other countries. 38 With this understanding, free
trade was an instrument of international, not domestic policy, and
was therefore a matter of international, not national, politics. 39 This
transformation from the domestic agenda to the international
agenda, from the economic case for free trade to the political case for

contained in William R. Allen, The International Trade Philosophy of Cordell Hull,
1907-1933, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 101 (1953).
34.
See, e.g., Allen, supra note 33.
35.
Id.
36.
This is, of course, the standard economic rationale for free trade. See
sources cited supranote 1.
37.
As one commentator has noted:
As a Wilsonian, Hull argued against the unequal and monopolistic benefits
conferred by tariffs. Hull saw imports as largely noncompetitive with domestic
industry, however, and he showed little understanding of the principle of
comparative advantage. Hull relentlessly attacked the assumption that the
United States could export without importing, pointed to the contradiction
between U.S. trade and financial policies, and staunchly defended the mostfavored-nations principle as a way of reducing discrimination abroad. More
important to Hull, however, were international leadership and the connection
he drew between protectionism, nationalism, and international conflict. For
Hull, free trade was a universal political solvent that would dissolve underlying
international conflicts.
Stephan Haggard, The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 42 INT. ORG. 91, 104 (1988) [hereinafter
Haggard, InstitutionalHegemony].
38.
Id.
39.
Hull also recognized, of course, that reducing foreign tariffs would also
enhance the prosperity of the country by allowing it to sell abroad the "immense
surplus in a steadily increasing number of industries." HULL MEMOIRS, supra note 33,
at 85. This export-oriented rationale for free trade emphasizes the domestic benefits of
free trade but requires international negotiations to reduce foreign barriers.

912

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37-897

free trade, is the transformation that occupied the country in the
middle decades of the twentieth century.
Until the 1930s, the United States viewed tariffs solely as a
domestic policy matter, with the international consequences of tariffs
playing at most a subservient role. Beginning with the founding of
the republic, tariffs were justified on a series of policy goals-to raise
revenue, to protect infant industries, to equalize the cost of
production, and to preserve jobs. 40 Each such policy reason saw tariffs
as an instrument of domestic policy, with no thought given to the
international implications of the policy.
Early U.S. tariffs were purely revenue measures. Tariffs made
up ninety percent of the federal government's revenue until 1861.41
Naturally, even revenue measures could be used for protectionist
purposes, 42 but the early tariffs were moderate, 43 and tariffs for
revenue are fundamentally different from tariffs for protection. Using
tariffs for revenue presumes that the imports that will be taxed are
those that will not be discouraged by the tariff; otherwise, the tariffs
will not be a source of revenue. The objective of a revenue tariff is not
to identify imports that should be reduced but to identify imports that
will not be reduced substantially by the tariff. Thus, when Madison
proposed the first tariff in 1789, he proposed that the duty should fall
on "such articles . . . only as are likely to occasion the least

40.
PASTOR, CONGRESS AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 18, at 73; SIDNEY
RATNER, THE TARIFF IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1972).
41.
See, e.g., RATNER, supra note 40.

42.
When Madison proposed the first tariff bill in 1789, representative Clymer
of Pennsylvania wanted to include steel on the list of taxable items because
the manufacture of steel in America was rather in its infancy; but as all the
materials necessary to make it were the product of every state in the Union,
and as the manufacture was already established, and attendant with
considerable success, he deemed it prudent to emancipate our country from the
manacles in which she was held by foreign manufacturers....
C.A. BEARD, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 163 (1915). In his
history of United States tariff policy, Franklin Taussig emphasized the protective
nature of the first tariff act. See FRANKLIN TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 15 (7th ed. 1922) [hereinafter TAUSSIG, TARIFF HISTORY]. He reached

this conclusion, however, by emphasizing the exceptions to the general duty of five
percent, which was the non-protectionist, revenue-generating duty. Id. He admits,
moreover, that for twenty years following the publication of Alexander Hamilton's
Report on Manufactures in 1792, which advanced the infant industry argument for the
young country, "the duties were increased from time to time as more revenue was
needed, but they were in all cases moderate." Id. at 16.
43.
The first tariff averaged 8.5 percent, and through the first half of the
nineteenth century the tariff increased only as revenue needs increased. See PASTOR,
CONGRESS AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 18, at 73.
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did not intend that
difficulty." 44 As one commentator stated, "Madison
45
his bill should act as a regulator of imports.
As the country weaned itself from revenue tariffs, policy-makers
employed various protectionist ideologies to interpret the need for,
and to shape the contours of, tariffs. At first, policy-makers used the
infant industry argument as the explicit basis of U.S. tariff policy, but
as the United States emerged from the Civil War and began its own
industrial revolution and capitalist expansion, that rationale became
increasingly untenable. 46 Beginning late in the nineteenth century,
therefore, the tariff came to be seen as a protector of general welfare
and full employment, with the primary focus being the need to protect
from competition from goods
high wages in the United States
47
produced in low wage countries.
Throughout the early twentieth century, the tariff policy debate
was conducted solely in terms of domestic interests, with little
attention given to the external effects, or international consequences
of, tariffs. 48 So entrenched was this domestic, general welfare view of
tariff policy that just before he left office, President Hoover vetoed a
bill from the new Democratic Congress that called for an
international conference to reduce tariffs, declaring "[f]rom [the first
legislative act of Washington's administration to this day], one of our
firm national policies has been that tariffs are solely a domestic
question in protection of our own people"; an international conference
would represent a "radical change in historic policies. '49 He repeated

44.
45.
46.

D.R. DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 80 (1922).
BAUER ET AL., BUSINESS AND POLICY, supranote 17, at 12.
TAUSSIG, TARIFF HISTORY, supra note 42, at 463, is the classic study of the

infant industry argument and its influence on United States tariff policy. See id. at 1-7
for Taussig's understanding of the infant industry lens through which he wrote his
book.
The idea that tariffs should be based on the need to compensate for the low
47.
prices of goods produced in countries with lower wage rates surfaced as early as the
1840s. See id. at 65. In 1909, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act set minimal rates but
allowed the President to modify the rates to equalize the cost of production between
domestic and foreign goods, the so-called flexible tariff. The flexible tariff provision
lapsed during the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, but was reinserted
in the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922. See PASTOR, CONGRESS AND ECONOMIC
POLICY, supra note 18, at 75-76.

Indeed, to the extent that the international ramification of tariffs mattered,
48.
they were cited as a reason not to lower tariffs. Republican opponents of free trade
would ask, for example, why the United States would want to benefit producers in
foreign countries.
Veto of a Bill to Amend The Tariff Act of 1930, PUB. PAPERS 204 (May 11,
49.
1932) [hereinafter HOOVER'S PAPERS]; see WILLIAM MYERS AND WALTER H. NEWTON,
THE HOOVER ADMINISTRATION, A DOCUMENTED NARRATIVE 493-95 (1936). One

interpretation of Hoover's politics suggests that President Hoover did not draw a
connection between domestic protectionism and its effects on America's exports and
world trade. JOAN HOFF WILSON, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1920-33
75, 88-100 (1971) [hereinafter WILSON, AMERICAN BUSINESS].
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the general welfare rationale for supporting protection by stating that
there has "never been a time in the history of the United States when
tariff protection was more essential to the welfare of the American
people than at present. 5 o
The RTAA abandoned this domestic focus. Congress authorized
the President to enter into binding negotiations with foreign
countries and, when called for by those negotiations, to raise or lower
any import duty up to fifty percent. 5 1 The proclaimed import duties
would apply on a most favored nations basis-that is, to all countries
without discrimination. 52 The negotiating authority lasted three
years, and during that time Congress would not overturn any
decision of the President. 53 After the three-year period, the rates of
duty proclaimed by the President would last indefinitely unless
abrogated by Congress upon six months' notice.5 4 Congressional
power over the negotiations was only to decide whether to renew the
negotiating authority after the three-year period. 55
In one fell swoop, the locus of tariff making was moved from
Congress to the President and made a part of international policymaking through negotiations. The Act, which still forms the template
that animates U.S. trade policy, simultaneously accomplished both a
domestic political triumph and an international relations coup.
On the domestic front, by moving lawmaking authority to the
President, the RTAA removed Congress from any direct role in
setting tariffs and thereby "reduced access to legislative mechanisms
that supported redistributive bargains and logrolling coalitions that
had led to high tariffs. '5 6 Transferring tariff power to the President

50.
51.

HOOVER'S PAPERS, supra note 49, at 205.
KAPLAN, TRADE POLICY, supra note 31, at 44-54.

52.
53.

Id.

54.

Id.

Id.

55.
Id.
56.
IRWIN, UNDER FIRE, supra note 6, at 155. This feature has led many
commentators to suggest that the RTAA came about because Congress, after seeing the
impact of Smoot-Hawley, realized that it had to get out of the tariff-making business.
See, e.g., ROBERT BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY (1985);
GRACE BECKETT, THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM (1941); PASTOR,
CONGRESS AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 18; JAMES SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND

RESURGANCE OF CONGRESS (1981); Judith Goldstein & Stefanie Lenway, Interests or
Institutions: An Inquiry in Congressional-ITCRelations, 33 INT'L STUD. Q. 303 (1989);
Helen Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, Trade Negotiations, Information, and Domestic
Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups, 8 ECON. & POL. 145 (1996). As Karen E. Schnietz
has shown, however, the claim can only be that New Deal Democrats in Congress
understood the damage done by the Smoot-Hawley legislation; all but nine of the
ninety-five legislators who voted for Smoot-Hawley voted against the RTAA, evidently
without taking any lesson from Smoot-Hawley. Karen E. Schnietz, The Institutional
Foundation of United States Trade Policy: Revisiting Explanations for the 1934
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 12 J.

POL. HIST. 417, 418-21 (2000) [hereinafter
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also reduced the pressure for higher tariffs because the President
represented a broad-based domestic constituency and was more in
touch with international concerns than Congress. 57 Although the
President's presumed national outlook did not often induce use of the
veto power against high tariffs set by Congress,5" it could seemingly
have influence once Congress was in a reactive, rather than a
proactive, posture. Moreover, the RTAA "locked in" tariff reductions.
Had the Democratic Congress merely reduced the high tariffs
legislatively-the approach that Democrats had traditionally followed
when they took over Congress-the tariffs could simply have been
increased when Republicans again gained control of Congress-just
as they had been in earlier times when the Republicans regained
control from the Democrats. By attaching tariff reductions to
reciprocal promises by other countries, the RTAA made it more
difficult for a Republican Congress to reverse course. The threat of
retaliation by foreign governments acted as a counterweight to
Republican protectionist proclivities. 59
On the international front, the delegation of authority to the
President made it easier for the President to negotiate with foreign

Schnietz, InstitutionalFoundation].The related argument that Congress delegated its
power to the president because it found the tariff setting workload to be intolerable has
also been effectively rebutted. Michael Bailey et al., The Institutional Roots of
American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and InternationalTrade, 49 WORLD POL.
309 (1997) [hereinafter Bailey et al., InstitutionalRoots].
57.
As Douglas Irwin has written:
The national electoral base of the president is often thought to make the
executive more apt to favor policies that benefit the nation as a whole, whereas
the narrower geographic representative structure of Congress leads its
members to have more parochial interests. Furthermore, the president is more
likely than Congress, to take into account trade policy's ramifications for
foreign policy.
IRWIN, UNDER FIRE, supra note 6, at 155-56. See also Haggard, InstitutionalHegemony,
supra note 37, at 93 (noting that increased executive influence over trade policy
resulted in a relative decline of protectionism); Schnietz, Institutional Foundation,
supra note 56, at 429 (pointing out that even Republican presidents were more
moderate in their protectionism than Republican legislators). For a generalized model
showing the effect of constituency size on highly focused interests, see Barry Weingast
et al., The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to
Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642 (1981).

58.
The debacle of the Smoot-Hawley tariff has often been attributed to
President Hoover, who initiated the process in order to fulfill a campaign promise to
farmers and then stood idly by while the process spun out of control. See generally
LAWRENCE CHAMBERLAIN, THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND LEGISLATION 131 (1946)

("Presidential leadership was not conspicuous in the formulation of the Hawley-Smoot
Tariff Act of 1930."); PASTOR, CONGRESS AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 18, at 8082.
59.
This feature of the RTAA is stressed in Schnietz, Institutional Foundation,
supra note 56, at 421-38; Bailey et al., InstitutionalRoots, supra note 56, at 318.
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countries. Before the RTAA, the President could implement
international tariff negotiations only by submitting them to Congress
in the form of a treaty. Because a treaty required a two-thirds vote in
the Senate, a minority of senators could easily block the
implementation of any international agreement.60 Now Congress had
given up its right to block the implementation of reciprocal trade
treaties and had left itself only the power to revoke the negotiating
authority and legislate new tariffs prospectively. 61 The power given to
the President mirrored the power that most other heads of state had
62
with respect to tariff negotiations.
Finally, the RTAA gave encouragement to exporters, whose
interest in freer trade and reciprocal tariff reductions had been
unrecognized in U.S. policy. As Douglas Irwin explained:
The RTAA helped to bolster the bargaining and lobbying position of
exporters in the political process. Previously, the main trade-related
special interest groups on Capital Hill were domestic producers facing
import competition since the benefit of high tariffs to those producers

60.
See Schnietz, InstitutionalFoundation, supra note 56, at 433 (pointing out
that "eighteen of the twenty-one trade agreements proposed during the nineteenth
century failed, either because the Senate outright rejected them or because Senate
amendments made the agreements unacceptable to the other country"). Of the twelve
reciprocal treaties negotiated by President McKinley, Congress approved none.
Needless to say, before the RTAA of 1934, foreign countries did not view negotiations
with the United States over tariffs to be a realistic possibility. According to a 1933
report by the United States Tariff Commission, "[tihe greatest single obstacle to the
completion of reciprocity arrangements appears to be the difficulty in securing the
assent of two-thirds of the Senators to such arrangements." Id. Cordell Hull himself
experienced problems with international negotiations that depended on treaty
ratification by the Senate. As he wrote:
While I was at London [at the trade conference of 1933] the President had
instructed the State Department to begin the negotiation of treaties calling for
Senate ratification, and we duly entered into negotiations with Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Portugal, and Sweden. Only with Columbia was a treaty
signed, and this was not even submitted to the Senate for approval, hence did
not become effective.
HULL MEMOIRS, supra note 33, at 354.
61.
See Schnietz, InstitutionalFoundation, supra note 56, at 436 (adding that
protectionist Republicans "were reduced to mere lobbyists on tariff issues, rather than
powerful political actors").
62.
As one commentator has written:
Executives of twenty-six foreign nations may change duty rates without
reference to the legislature and twelve others may make such changes
provisional upon approval by the legislature. Additional consideration must be
given the fact that most foreign nations operate on the ministerial principle,
which makes ratification of such treaty rates a matter of course, in the absence
of some larger disagreement as to the policy between the minister and his
party.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 46 YALE L.J. 647, 665-66 n. 109 (1937).
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were relatively concentrated. Exporters were harmed by high tariffs,
but only indirectly. The cost to exporters of any particular import duty
was relatively diffuse, and therefore exporters failed to organize an
effective political opposition. The RTAA explicitly linked foreign tariff
reductions that were beneficial to exporters to lower tariff protection for
producers competing against imports. This fostered the development of
exporters as organized groups opposing high domestic tariffs because
they wanted to secure lower foreign tariffs on their products. In
addition, the lower tariffs negotiated under the RTAA increased the
size of export sectors and decreased the size of sectors that competed
with imports, and thereby increased the political clout of interests
63
supporting renewals of RTAA.

In summary, the RTAA had four effects that would shape U.S.
and global trade policy for the next seventy years. It reduced the
power of protectionist interests, enhanced the power of exporter
interests, put decision-making in the hands of the President with a
national (not parochial) constituency, and emphasized the
international implications of tariff making. By suppressing
protectionist interests and making tariff policy responsive to broader
national interests, the Act clearly tipped the balance of policy-making
away from higher tariffs. By energizing and enabling the political
interests of exporters, the Act gave the President the power to put
together domestic political coalitions supporting free trade. 64 By
making national tariff policy a matter of international diplomacy, the
Act shifted the focus of policy from domestic matters to the burdens
imposed on foreigners, indicating that tariff policy was now being
informed by new values.
But which were effects and which were causes? The historical
record makes the answer clear. The RTAA was designed to recognize
that setting tariffs is a matter of international policy-making. The
purpose the shift to reciprocal reductions, and the driving force
behind it, was the recognition that tariff policy made in one country

63.
IRWIN, UNDER FIRE, supra note 6, at 156. The enhanced weight behind
export interests became, over time, self-reinforcing; the RTAA gave voice to exporters'
interests and as barriers to foreign markets dropped, those interests intensified. This
gave the reciprocal tariff reduction program a self-generating dynamic that soon led
Republicans to support the program. See IRWIN, SMOOT-HAWLEY TO RTAA, supra note
21. For a formal model showing the effect of reciprocal tariff reductions on domestic
exporter interests, see Bailey et al., Institutional Roots, supra note 56, at 325-29
("[I]ncreasing trade leads members of Congress and foreign actors to place more weight
on access to foreign markets, indifference curves shift out, and greater liberalization is
possible.").
64.
Douglas Irwin has pointed out, for example, that Republican members of
Congress were won over to the concept of reciprocal, negotiated reductions in tariffs by
their exporting constituents after World War 11, but not before, indicating that it was
the emergence of the export interest as a political force that triggered Republican
interest in free trade. Douglas Irwin, Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing
Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization After SmootHawley, 42 J.L. & ECON. 643, 653 (1999).
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had adverse effects on other countries and therefore was a matter of
international, not just domestic, interest. The preamble to the Act is
explicit on this point: the President's power to act is contingent on his
finding "as a fact that any existing duties or other import restrictions
of the United States or any foreign country are unduly burdening and
restricting the foreign trade of the United States. '6 5 Both the adverse
effect of foreign tariffs on U.S. export interests and the adverse effect
of U.S. tariffs on foreign interests became relevant to determining the
appropriate shape of U.S. tariff policy; that shape could only be
determined practically by delegating the policy-making authority to
the President, because only the President could enter into the kind of
negotiations in which the joint interests of countries could be
explored.
The internationalist underpinnings of the RTAA are apparent in
the two principal arguments supporting its passage: jobs for exporters
and the international consequences of tariffs. President Roosevelt
wanted jobs for exporters, not free trade. 66 Interest in exports as a
way of increasing domestic production and jobs was the political
motive behind the RTAA, 67 which Roosevelt presented as a response
to the Depression. 68 Douglas Irwin has nicely captured the primary

65.
An Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 474, § 350(a), 73 Stat. 943, 943
(1934).
66.
Both President Roosevelt and many within his administration were
ambivalent about tariff liberalization. See Haggard, Institutional Hegemony, supra
note 37, at 96-97, 107-10. Indeed, early in the New Deal the efforts to create jobs
resulted in proposals for higher tariffs; both the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) and the Agricultural Assistance Act (AAA) permitted imports to be limited if
imports interfered with the operation of these programs. See JUDITH GOLDSTEIN,
IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 139 (1993); HULL MEMOIRS, supra
note 33, at 353. President Roosevelt had earlier rejected Hull's proposal to reduce
tariffs across the board by ten percent. Haggard, Institutional Hegemony, supra, note
37, at 112.
67.
In the early 1930s, "[eixport-oriented manufacturers, commercial interests,
and the internationalized financial community of New York strongly favored reciprocal
trade agreements; a network of interlocking foreign trade associations were active in
lobbying the State Department towards that end." Haggard, Institutional Hegemony,
supra note 37, at 98 (citations omitted). See also LLOYD GARDNER, ECONOMIC ASPECTS
OF NEW DEAL DIPLOMACY 40-42 (1964) (explaining the "most-favored-nation" principle
and its opposition); WILSON, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 49, at 98-100
(distinguishing New Deal reciprocity from free trade); Thomas Ferguson, From
Normalcy to New Deal; Industrial Structure, Party Competition and American Public
Policy in the Great Depression, 38 INT'L ORG. 41 (1984) (discussing in-depth Roosevelt
and his successive New Deals).
68.
See Robert Baldwin, The Changing Nature of U.S. Trade Policy Since WW
II, in STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 8-10 (Robert Baldwin
& Anne Kruger eds., 1984); John Cuddington & Ronald McKinnon, Free Trade versus
Protectionism: A Perspective, in TARIFFS, QUOTAS, AND TRADE: THE POLITICS OF
PROTECTIONISM (1979);

GARDNER,

STERLING DIPLOMACY, supra note 6, at 20-22;

LENWAY, TRADE POLITICS, supra note 31, at 65 (The Act "was presented to Congress as
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thrust behind Franklin Roosevelt's campaign to secure passage of the
RTAA:
In order to reduce foreign barriers against U.S. exports, stimulate
export growth, and thus help recover from the depression, the Roosevelt
administration sought better access to foreign markets by offering
lower tariffs at home in exchange for lower tariffs abroad. The
Administration sold the RTAA as an emergency measure to spur
economic recovery from the depression. . . . Democrats supported the
RTAA on the hope that the executive branch, now given more authority
over trade policy, would reach trade agreements that would stimulate
69
exports as well as moderate import duties.

The export orientation of the Act was confirmed by the Act's
preamble, which affirmed the purpose to "expand[] foreign markets
for the products of the United States ... so that foreign markets will
be made available to those branches of American production which
require and are capable of developing such outlets. ' 70 This emphasis
was repeated in Hull's own testimony before Congress, where he
confirmed that "the primary object of this new proposal is both to
reopen the old and to seek new outlets for our surplus production,
through the gradual moderation of the excessive and more extreme
impediments to the admission of American products into foreign
71
markets."
These sentiments were echoed repeatedly in the course of
approval of the legislation. Professor Schnietz has summarized the
evidence:
In presenting the RTAA to Congress, Roosevelt predicted that
"important branches of agriculture, such as cotton, tobacco, hogs and
rice, and those branches of American industry whose mass production
methods have led the world, will find expanded opportunities and
productive capacity in foreign markets." Many legislators agreed.
Senator Arthur Capper, a progressive Kansas Republican, supported
the RTAA because he believed it would open up export markets to U.S.
agricultural products. Representative Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) was
similarly supportive. And Representative Thomas Ford (D-Calif.) was
jubilant about the RTAA's reciprocity feature and the proliberalization
lobby that it might create. Export-oriented interest groups also
understood how vital the RTAA and its reciprocity feature were to
opening up foreign markets. A representative of the National
Automobile Chamber of Commerce displayed a sophisticated
understanding of trade economics when he argued the RTAA would
"restore many of the jobs destroyed by trade strangulation in the past,

an emergency remedy for U.S. exports."); Haggard, InstitutionalHegemony, supra note
38, at 101.
IRWIN, UNDER FIRE, supra note 6, at 153-54.
69.
An Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 474, § 350(a), 73 Stat. 943, 943
70.
(1934).
71.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Hearing on H.R. 8430 Before the House
Comm. On Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 2, 4 (1934) (statement of Cordell Hull).
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and through revival of the purchasing power of our workingmen, will
72
help to reestablish a larger domestic demand for goods of all kinds."

If jobs for exporters were the practical lever behind the RTAA,
the ideological lever was the effect of tariffs on foreigners-their
international political effect. Although the RTAA was sold as a jobcreating measure, the Act also recognized the interdependence of
tariff policy-making. 73 Here the practical political energy of Franklin
74
Roosevelt met the driving internationalism of Cordell Hull.
Roosevelt wanted jobs for his people; Hull recognized that our tariffs
deny jobs to foreign producers who are in a position to operate
efficiently across borders, while foreign tariffs impose the same
disability on U.S. producers. Roosevelt had the politically potent
argument; Hull had the intellectually coherent one.
Hull's position recognized the intense interest that each country
has in the tariff policies of other countries. He could not have been
more specific:
To me it seemed virtually impossible to develop friendly relations with
other nations in the political sphere so long as we provoked their
animosity in the economic sphere. How could we promote peace with
them while waging war with them commercially? When I came into the
State Department I found in the files no fewer than thirty-four formal
and emphatic diplomatic protests presented by as many nations
following the passage of the Smoot-Hawley high-tariff Act. Nor had
their protests been confined to words. Goaded by what they regarded as
almost an embargo keeping out their exports to the United States, they
75
retaliated in kind.

In this view, tariffs are not bad because they hurt consumers in
the country imposing the tariff. They are bad because they hurt
foreigners and therefore international relations. 76 That is why the

72.
Schnietz, Institutional Foundation,supra note 56, at 437.
73.
MICHAEL BUTLER, CAUTIOUS VISIONARY: CORDELL HULL AND TRADE
REFORM, 1933-1937 53-55 (1998) (discussing the potential effects of discriminatory
trade policy).
74.
Several accounts of the passage of the RTAA emphasize the importance of
Cordell Hull's internationalist ideology on both President Roosevelt and Congress. See,
e.g., id. (illustrating Cordell Hull's determination, persistence, and legislative
experience as determining factors at every stage of the Trade Agreements Act); WAYNE
COLE, ROOSEVELT AND THE ISOLATIONISTS, 1932-45, 95-112 (1983); ALFRED ECKES,
OPENING AMERICA'S MARKET: U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY SINCE 1776 (1995); IRWIN
GELLMAN, SECRET AFFAIRS: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, CORDELL HULL, AND SUMNER
WELLES 94 (1995); WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW
DEAL, 1932-40 203-05 (1963); DEXTER PERKINS, THE NEW AGE OF FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT, 1932-45 88 (1948); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW
DEAL (1957); Judith Goldstein, The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of
U.S. Agriculturaland ManufacturingPolicies, 43 INT'L ORG. 31, 61-66 (1989).
75.
HULL MEMOIRS, supra note 33, at 355.
76.
Contemporary understanding was that the delegation of tariff-making
power was "to be used by the President as an instrument to increase trade, and thereby
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President's power to change tariffs is explicitly grounded on the
77
"burden" they impose on international trade.
These twin political levers supporting the RTAA-export jobs and
the international political consequences of tariffs-represent both
continuity and contrast when compared to pre-existing trade policy
and ideology. Tariff policy continued to be an employment policy, just
as it had been before 1934. President Roosevelt, who knew that he
could not unilaterally lower tariffs at a time of great unemployment,
shifted his focus from import-competing jobs to export-related jobs,
but he continued to focus on jobs. The RTAA continued the belief that
tariff policy should maximize jobs as a part of the government's
employment policy.
At the same time, the RTAA represented a dramatic shift away
from the notion that tariffs are a matter solely of domestic policy.
Although domestic interests still mattered, the country could not
ignore the international implication of tariffs-namely, the effect on
foreigners. Tariff policy was turned from an inward-looking political
battle between domestic interest groups to an outward-looking search
for transnational cooperative solutions.
The transformation was not, in other words, conversion to free
trade itself. As Douglas Irwin has pointed out, "politicians did not
undergo an ideological conversion to free trade, and there was no
apparent shift in the underlying trade-related interest groups
between the passage of Smoot-Hawley and the RTAA in 1934. 78s The
conversion was not in appreciating the domestic, economic rationale
for free trade, but in appreciating the international effects of trade
policy; the ideological conversion was from a domestic to an
international orientation.
Significantly, this export-oriented, job-creating rationale for the
Act would not have been possible had foreign countries not raised
their tariffs in response to the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930 and the
worldwide depression. Had foreign countries not choked off U.S.
exports, the President would not have been able to gather political
support for the Act as an employment measure because there would
have been no way to present the RTAA as a way of opening up foreign
markets and thus no need to transfer the tariff-setting authority to

contribute to peace, and other ends within the interest of diplomatic policy." Trade
Agreements Act, supra note 62, at 666. See Richard Cooper, Trade Policy as Foreign
Policy, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD 299 (Robert Stern ed., 1987)

(discussing the view that unhampered international trade would raise the standard of
living in foreign countries and eliminate dissatisfaction that breeds war); Stephen
Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade, 28 WORLD POL. 317
(1976).
77.
See sources cited supra note 59.
78.

IRWIN, UNDER FIRE, supra note 6, at 154.
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the President. It was only because the President needed to break
down foreign barriers to U.S. exports that the President could get
political support to transfer power over tariffs from Congress to the
executive. 79 Moreover, even Democrats did not favor unilateral tariff
reductions;8 0 the decision to eschew unilateral cuts lends support to
the notion that tariffs were now perceived to raise international, not
domestic, policy issues.
In other words, the fundamental insight that drove the RTAA
tariffs
have
international
recognition
that
was
the
repercussions-namely, that higher tariffs have an adverse effect on
foreign producers and provoke international friction.8 1 Without these
dynamics, the need for Presidential control of tariff rates in the
context of international negotiations would have been unnecessary.
82
This insight provides a complete justification for the Act.
Notably missing from the RTAA debate was reference to the
interests of domestic consumers or the need to overcome the influence
of protectionist interests on Congress. As one writer noted in 1941,
imports were the "step-child"8 3 of the trade agreements concept;
increasing imports was thought to be important in trade negotiations
only to allow foreign producers to earn dollars to buy American goods.
Reduction of American tariffs, obviously necessary as a bargaining
instrument, was also advocated as an indispensable means of providing
foreign countries with the dollars to purchase American goods, an
argument which carried much conviction in a period of exchange
difficulties when international lending had ceased. Our tariff
reductions were called "concessions," a term implying sacrifices on our
part, and treated as a necessary evil justified by increased exports. The
State Department made no attempt to counteract the idea that
enlarging exports was the sole goal of the trade agreements program; in
fact, the Department advertised increased exports as a first line of
84
political support in defense of the program.

79.
IRWIN, SMOOT-HAWLEY TO RTAA, supra note 21.
80.
See Bailey et al., InstitutionalRoots, supra note 56, at 317.
81.
It is of interest-and somewhat paradoxical-that at the same time that
Roosevelt was encouraging international cooperation over trade in order to enhance
United States exports, he was allowing the dollar to devalue, thereby further
encouraging exports, although in this case without the cooperation of, and at the
expense of, other countries. See Haggard, Institutional Hegemony, supra note 37, at
102. It was not until World War II that the Roosevelt administration would promote
cooperation on exchange rate policy as well as a tariff policy.
82.
Bailey et al., InstitutionalRoots, supra note 56, at 317-24, have developed a
sophisticated model of reciprocal bargaining under the RTAA. They conclude that: "The
RTAA makes perfect sense given the preferences of American political actors and an
assumption of strategic behavior. No extra assumptions about congressional laziness or
congressional antipathy toward special interests are necessary." Id. at 321.
83.
DIEBOLD, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 22, at 15.
Id. at 16. The emphasis on the importance of exports never faltered after
84.
World War II started, even though trading relations changed dramatically and many
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To be sure, Republican members of Congress understood that the
effect of the RTAA would be to weaken their power and that this
would weaken the power of protectionist interests in industry.85 But
their objection was primarily to the loss of their power and not to the
loss of protection for their constituents. Senator William Borah's
comments are representative: "What kind of a miserable politician
would I be, having been selected by my people to represent them, to
barter away my power and surrender my influence in such
matters."8 6 Moreover, the recognition of the effects of the legislation
by its opponents does not support the notion that curtailing the power
of protectionist interests in Congress was the purpose of the
legislation.
The historical record's failure to refer to the benefits of imports
for consumers or the need to blunt protectionist forces is striking: it
suggests that addressing tariffs as a matter of domestic policy to
promote economic efficiency was not at the heart of the Roosevelt
program. 87 Moreover, the passage of the RTAA and the emergence of

countries abrogated their commitments to lower tariffs-which they were allowed to do
under the trade agreement's war clause. United States exports continued to grow as
the United States became a major supplier of war material, but some exporters lost
foreign markets because of the higher tariffs and sought to have the United States
retaliate with higher tariffs. When asked whether the United States should withdraw
its lower tariffs in retaliation, the State Department again said that the low tariffs
were necessary so that foreigners could sell goods in the United States that would earn
the dollars they needed to buy United States goods. Again, exports were the goal of
United States policy and imports became the means of financing that goal. Id. at 48-49.
85.
See Schnietz, InstitutionalFoundation,supra note 56, at 436-37.
86.
Id. at 435. One of the reasons that Republicans phrased their objections to
the RTAA in terms of Congressional prerogatives, of course, was that they planned to
challenge the constitutionality of the delegation of the power to the President. Id.
87.
Indeed, it is not clear that the RTAA significantly blunted the power of
protectionist influences in Congress. First, President Roosevelt was forced to revise the
legislation so that the power delegated to him lasted only three years; when he went
back to seek renewal, the protectionists in Congress had the opportunity to derail the
reciprocal trade agreements program. Second, the protectionist interests were not cut
out of the lawmaking process; their participation was channeled through the executive
branch rather than directly through Congress, but any group that had influence within
the President's party could still lobby for protection. Indeed, during his presidential
campaign, President Roosevelt had suggested that tariff making be delegated to the
Tariff Commission, with only limited amendments allowed by Congress, for exactly this
reason. See Haggard, InstitutionalHegemony, supra note 37, at 106-07. The Act set up
an elaborate series of notice and opportunities to be heard, including through an
interdepartmental group that would work with the Secretary of State to guide the
negotiations. See Trade Agreements Act, supra note 62, at 649-50. Initial secrecy
surrounding the program was later removed in order to give interested parties an
opportunity to state their views. Id. at 667. Because protectionist interests remained a
political force, and perhaps out of political caution in the years before the program's
first renewal, the United States looked for concessions that did not threaten powerful
interests. And the concessions made by the United States in the early years of the
program were hardly sweeping. They included binding goods that were already on the
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the United States as an exporting powerhouse after World War II
could hardly have been anticipated in 1934, making the antiprotectionist story behind the RTAA a fragile one.
Had President Roosevelt's goal been to suppress protectionist
interests, he could have reached it in other, more direct ways. In
particular, he could have revived old proposals to commit tariff
making to an administrative agency with explicit standards for
setting tariffs. Such an approach, which was almost adopted earlier
in the century, 88 would have insulated the decision-makers from
protectionist interests and allowed them to give greater weight to
consumer interests.8 9 In the alternative, Roosevelt might have asked
for power to reduce tariffs unilaterally;9 0 he might have relied on the
provisions of the flexible tariff, which, by authorizing Presidential
revisions of the tariff schedule, was designed-even by Republicansto counter the logrolling tendencies of Congress. 9 1 He was convinced,
however, that trade and tariff policy needed a reciprocal and
international, not unilateral, approach, and he therefore opted to
embed U.S. policy in the policy of other countries.
In sum, the RTAA was a pivotal event because it gave political
punch to the interests of exporters and recognized that one nation's
tariff policy is interdependent with the tariff policies of other nations.
It was not a complete victory for internationalism, however, because
it was supported on the basis of its ability to create jobs. Presumably
the emphasis on the use of tariffs to create jobs could revert to
supporting protectionism as soon as producers competing against
imports gained more political strength-or could promise more new
jobs-than export industries. Over the next decade, however, the
rationale for supporting reciprocal trade negotiations would change;
the creation of jobs would no longer be the dominant theme, and the

free list because there were no competing domestic products (like coffee, tea, and
rubber), and specialty items in which particular countries had a high interest in selling
in the United States (like high-grade steel, matches, cement, laces, coal-tar dyes,
manganese, whisky, perfumes, and cheeses). Id. at 650.
88.
This is the story of the establishment of the International Trade
Commission and the proposal to give it tariff-setting authority.
89.
Indeed, during his presidential campaign, President Roosevelt had
suggested that tariff making be delegated to the Tariff Commission, with only limited
amendments allowed by Congress, for exactly this reason. See Haggard, Institutional
Hegemony, supra note 37, at 106-07.
90.
As Richard Gardner said, the RTAA "had some defects as an instrument for
more liberal trade" in that it did not allow unilateral, across-the-board tariff
reductions. GARDNER, STERLING DIPLOMACY, supra note 6, at 21-22.
91.
The flexible tariff provisions had been included in the Smoot-Hawley
legislation at the insistence of President Hoover, who threatened to veto the legislation
if it did not contain them. See PASTOR, CONGRESS AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note
18, at 82. It was that feature of the bill that appealed to both moderate Republicans
and Democrats. Id. at 82-83.
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emphasis on exports would be downplayed. In its place, support for
reciprocal tariff negotiations, and thus for an institution like GATT,
would come from the recognition that because tariffs hurt foreigners,
the world needs a process by which one country can influence the
policies of another country.

IV. THE SECOND TRANSFORMATION: THE KEYNESIAN REVOLUTION

The RTAA was renewed in 1937 and 1940, substantially on the
same grounds that had led to its enactment in 1934.92 It was later
renewed during wartime conditions in 1943 and again in 1945 (the
93
renewal that gave rise to the first negotiations under GATT).
During the War, the philosophy supporting reciprocal negotiations
began to focus more and more on the international political
consequences and less and less on jobs. As planning for the post-War
world took place in the early 1940s, the notion that trade negotiations
would be a source of stability and peace became the predominant
paradigm supporting the formation of a stronger and institutionalized
system of trade negotiations. 94 The war metaphor and its cognate, the

92.
When Cordell Hull spoke about renewal, he put jobs and prosperity second
to the importance of promoting good international relations. In his February 26, 1939
testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, Hull stated:
In the face of grave hindrances growing out of fears of war and preparations for
war, the operation of the reciprocal trade agreements program had the effect of
inducing many important nations to halt their runaway races in the erection of
excessive economic barriers to trade and gradually to move in the opposite
direction; while still other nations were induced to slow down their efforts to
attain economic self-containment. Furthermore, the program was an important
factor in bringing about a development of closer general relationships with and
among many nations, while it was making its important contribution to income
and employment in the United States.
HULL MEMOIRS, supra note 33, at 748. By this time, on the eve of war, even Roosevelt
was supporting reciprocal negotiations on the ground that the Act was "an
indispensable part of any stable and endurable peace." Id. at 747.
93.
See PASTOR, CONGRESS AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 18, at 93-96
(discussing how bilateralism had reached its point of usefulness and 1934 negotiating
authority had been "used-up").
94.
See, e.g., GARDNER, STERLING DIPLOMACY, supra note 6, at 8-9 ("The
principal planners shared a genuine belief in the critical importance of economic
factors. 'If goods can't cross borders, soldiers will' was a slogan well suited to the
rationalist and materialist elements in the American intellectual heritage.") Similarly,
Harry Hawkins, who was the State Department architect of postwar planning (as
Director of the Office of Economic Affairs) said in 1944:
We've seen that when a country gets starved out economically, its people are all
too ready to follow the first dictator who may rise up and promise them all jobs.
Trade conflict breeds non-cooperation, suspicious, bitterness. Nations which are
economic enemies are not likely to remain friends for long.
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peace and stability metaphor, became the driving force behind the
effort to create an international institution to oversee trading
relations between countries. 95
These war and stability metaphors were based on the
interdependence of policy-making between countries and on the
notion that because policy made in one country would affect other
countries, policy made without regard to other nations would breed ill
will and economic friction. This latter notion was made explicit by
President Truman when he rallied support for an international
mechanism to allow one country to object to the trade policies of
another country:
One nation may take action in the interest (whether fancied or real) of
its own producers without notifying other nations, or consulting them,
or even considering how they might be hurt. It may cut down its
purchases of another country's goods, by raising its tariff or imposing
an embargo or a system of quotas on imports. And when it does this,
some producers in the other country will find the door to it suddenly
slammed and bolted in his face. Or a nation may subsidize its exports,
selling its goods abroad below their cost. And when it does this, a
producer in some other country will find his market flooded with the
goods that have been dumped. In either case, the producer gets angry,
just as you or I would get angry if such a thing were done to us. Profits
have disappeared; workers are dismissed. He feels that he has been
wronged, without warning and without reason. He appeals to his
government for action. His government retaliates, and another round of
tariff boosts, embargoes, quotas, and subsidies is under way. This is
economic war. And in such a conflict there can be no hope of victory.
The alternative to economic warfare is agreement to abide by common
rules, to cooperate in the solution of common problems, to enter into
consultation where interests come into conflict, to submit disputes to
peaceful settlement. But there can be no assurance that nations, in
general, will follow this course, completely or consistently, unless there
is an international organization in the field of trade. An international
organization would apply to commercial relationships the same
principles of fair dealing that the United Nations is applying to political
affairs. Instead of retaining unlimited freedom to commit acts of
economic aggression, its members would adopt a code of economic ethics
and agree to live according to its rules. Instead of taking action that
might be harmful to others, without warning and without consultation,
countries would sit down around a table and talk things out. In any
dispute, each party would present its case. The interests of all would be

Harry C. Hawkins, The Importance of International Commerce to Prosperity (Radio
broadcast, Apr. 2, 1944), in COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES 74, at 3. The peace and
stability metaphor was one that Hull had sounded earlier in the century as a young
Congressman. See supra note 33.
95.
For general accounts of the development of United States economic policy
in the context of foreign policy see WILLIAM Y. ELLIOTT, UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY (1952); PATRICK J. HEARDEN, ARCHITECTS OF GLOBALISM: BUILDING A NEW
WORLD ORDER DURING WORLD WAR 11 (2002); GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
1900-1950 (1952); WALTER LIPPMANN, U. S. WAR AIMS (1944).
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considered, and a reasonable solution would be found. In economics, as
96
in politics, this is the way to peace.

The message is clear. Trade restrictions are not a problem
because of their domestic effects; trade restrictions are a problem
because they adversely affect foreign producers. Because foreign
producers have no right to participate in the political process that
generates the trade restrictions, they get angry, and in the absence of
any other recourse, they ask their governments to retaliate, making
producers in both countries worse off. An international organization
would allow a government to represent its injured producers in
negotiations with the country imposing the trade barrier. 97 An
international organization would allow countries to represent their
people when they are adversely affected by another country's policy.
The need for negotiations to resolve political problems caused by
trade barriers became the common goal supporting an international
98
framework to allow international trade negotiations.
This emphasis on the use of tariff policy and trade negotiations
to break down barriers to exports is entirely consistent with the way

96.
President Harry S. Truman's Address on Foreign Economic Policy at Baylor
University, PUB. PAPERS 168-69 (Mar. 6, 1947).
97.
President Truman made this connection explicit, for his speech continued:
Instead of adopting measures that might be harmful to others, without warning
and without consultation, countries would sit around the table and talk things
out. In any dispute, each party would present its case. The interest of all would
be considered, and a fair and just solution would be found.
Id. at 169.
98.
See, e.g., PERCY W. BIDWELL, A COMMERCIAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED
NATIONS (1945); J.B. CONDLIFFE, AGENDA FOR A POSTWAR WORLD 34 (1942) ("It is a
delusion that nations can protect themselves, much less gain, at the expense of
others."); J.B. CONDLIFFE, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WORLD TRADE (1940) (generally
discussing the complications of tariffs and the conditions of economic cooperation);
HERBERT FEIS, THE SINEWS OF PEACE (1944) (analyzing how trade relations that a
country maintains with others will govern all its other economic ties); ALVIN H.
HANSEN, AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 95 (1945) ("The [Trade] Authority
should study the proposal from the point of view of whether the suggested changes in
trade policy would . . .have important adverse economic effects upon other countries
and upon the world prosperity in general."); MICHAEL A. HEILPERIN, THE TRADE OF
NATIONS 82 (1952) ("Like a cancerous growth, trade restrictions tend to spread more
and more widely. If they remain unchecked, they strike at the very existence of good
international relations. It is the general public that foots the bill, while special
interests collect the pecuniary benefits."); CALVIN B. HOOVER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT 92-93 (1943) (suggesting at the time that "the reduction of
tariffs through the renewed negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements should be
continued"); OTTO T. MALLERY, ECONOMIC UNION AND THE DURABLE PEACE 137 (1943)
("emphasizing the necessity of solving through an economic organization some of the
toughest economic problems . . . ');OSWALD G. VILLARD, FREE TRADE-FREE WORLD
(1947) (arguing for the removal of tariffs and all other handicaps to international
trade).
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the United States envisioned and used trade negotiations during the
War. Throughout the War, the dominant U.S. trade concern was the
preferential trade arrangements within the British Commonwealth,
preferences that restricted U.S. sales within the so-called Sterling
zone. The Atlantic Charter, signed by the United States and Britain
in 1941, was an explicit use by the United States of negotiating power
to break down policies that gave Britain preferential access to the
resources of its colonies. 99 With the Atlantic Charter, the countries
pledged themselves to a system in which they would
[e]ndeavor with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the
enjoyment by all states, great or small, victors or vanquished, of access,
on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world which are
needed for their economic prosperity, [and further that they] desired to
bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the
economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor
standards, economic advancement, and social security. 100

If the need for an international negotiating forum was the
driving force behind the establishment of GATT, yet another shift
influenced the rhetoric and rationale for an international mechanism
to control national tariff policy. Whereas jobs in the export sector
were uppermost in the minds of politicians when they crafted the
RTAA, the emphasis on jobs fell away by the end of the War. In the
interim, the Keynesian revolution had persuaded leaders of industrial
countries that control of the business cycle and unemployment could
be achieved by manipulating aggregate demand, that is, by running
government deficits during recessions and surpluses during
expansions, rather than by intervening in particular industries with
tariffs or subsidies. 10 ' The goal of full employment did not change, but

99.
The story of the Atlantic Charter is told in GARDNER, STERLING
DIPLOMACY, supra note 6, at 40-53. British influence over the post-War multilateral
trade system was limited by British desire to maintain preferences for colonies and
former colonies. See Jay Colbert, War-time Anglo American Talks and the Making of
GATT, 10 WORLD ECONOMY 381 (1987).
100.
WILLIAM BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD
TRADE 47 (1950).
101.
See, e.g., Bradford De Long, Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great
Depression, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTuRY 67-68 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998).
Before the Great Depression the U.S. government did not have a fiscal policy,
at least not in the sense that economists have meant for the past two
generations. The government did not attempt to tune its deficit or surplus to
achieve the goal of full employment or low inflation ....
Later depression-era
federal deficits were more voluntary: the government came to make a virtue
out of necessity and to trumpet the potential macroeconomic benefits of a
depression deficit. Thus the U.S. government abandoned the principle that the
only good peacetime budget was a balanced budget. And the depression eradeficits were continued and vastly expanded during World War II.
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leaders no longer viewed tariffs as a way of advancing that interest;
government interest in full employment was shifted from the
regulatory sphere of tariffs to the tax-and-spend tools of fiscal
policy. 10 2 The United States acted on this conviction in the
to the
Employment Act of 1946,103 which then served as a 1backdrop
04
liberal trade regime that the United States promoted.
The Keynesian revolution removed any reason for using tariff
and trade policy as part of domestic employment policy. Trade policy
was freed from any substantive domestic moorings. Nowhere is this
transformation and connection clearer than in the Proposals for
Expansion of World Trade and Employment 10 5 that the U.S. State
Department issued in November 1945.106 In the Proposals, the
United States and Great Britain set out a blueprint for a post-War
world and called for an international conference under United

On the Keynesian revolution in general, see JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (1936); HERBERT STEIN, THE FISCAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 131-68 (1969); PETER TEMIN, LESSONS FROM THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 86, 107-13 (1989).
102.
Richard Gardner traces the linkage between free trade and full
employment to the British-United States conferences in 1943 in STERLING DIPLOMACY,
supra note 6, at 103-09. He emphasizes that maintaining full employment was thought
to be a prerequisite to free trade. Id. at 104. My account stresses the shift from using
trade policy to achieve full employment to reliance on monetary and fiscal policy, a
point of emphasis of the British government. Id. at 105.
Employment Act of 1946, ch. 33, 79 Stat. 23 (1946). See generally STEPHEN
103.
BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW: THE STORY BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946
(1950); WALTER HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1966).
104.
The change noted here is part of the larger transformation of international
law that occurred when the United States projected the regulatory state of the New
Deal into international, multilateral institutions. See Anne-Marie Burley, Regulating
the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal
Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN
INSTITUTIONAL FORM 125, 129 (John Ruggie ed., 1993) ("[T]he domestic origins of the
specific contours of the postwar international order lie in the historical experience of
one liberal state: the United States during the New Deal.").
Proposalson World Trade and Employment, Joint Statement by the United
105.
States and the United Kingdom, 13 DEP'T ST. BULL 912 (1945) [hereinafter UNITED
STATES PROPOSALS].
106.
These proposals, in turn, were distilled from, and reflected, a growing
consensus. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT AND DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT (1945); COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC POLICY, WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT 3-21 (1944); HOUSE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON POSTWAR ECONOMIC POLICY AND PLANNING, POSTWAR FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1945); NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION,
AMERICA'S NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN WORLD TRADE No. 37-38 (1944). Several other works
echoed these themes after the Proposals were published. See, e.g., TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC NATIONAL
RELATIONS (1947), reprinted in NORMAN S. BUCHANAN & FRIEDRICH A. LUTZ,
REBUILDING THE WORLD ECONOMY: AMERICA'S ROLE IN FOREIGN TRADE AND
INVESTMENT 293-315 (1947); NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, A PROPOSED
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES (1946).
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Nations' sponsorship for the following summer. 10 7 The thrust of this
document emphasized the importance of international coordination of
trade and economic policies: its rationale echoes the interdependence
theme:
Unless [the countries] act together, they will act at cross purposes and
may well do serious damage to each other. But if they do act together,
there is every possibility that the peoples of the world may enjoy, in our
lifetime, a higher degree of prosperity and welfare than they have ever
108
had before.

Although acknowledging the economic case for free trade-that
"trade connects employment, production, and consumption and
facilitates all three"-the thrust of the Proposals was to build mutual
prosperity through mutual cooperation. According to the Proposals:
The fundamental choice is whether countries will struggle against each
other for wealth and power, or work together for security and mutual
advantage ....
The experience of cooperation in the task of earning a
living promotes both the habit and the techniques of common effort and
helps make permanent the mutual confidence on which the peace
depends. 109

The breadth of this document is remarkable. The Proposals are
not limited

to an

expansion

of the

reciprocal

trade

agreement

program on a multilateral basis; its subject matter goes far beyond
1 10
Instead, the
trade barriers, border measures, or trade preferences.

Proposals contemplated cooperation across a wide range of economic
matters, with a distinct emphasis on preserving harmony between

nations by preventing settled relations from being disrupted."' In
addition to the outlines for an international trade organization and

rules

governing

recommendations

trade

restrictions,

the

Proposals contained

for attacking "private combines

and cartels,"

proposals concerning "disorder in the markets for certain primacy
commodities," and proposals to address "irregularity, and fear of
irregularity,

107.
108.
109.
110.

in

production

and

employment"

(that is,

proposals

UNITED STATES PROPOSALS, supra note 105, at 913-14, 918-29.
Id. at 914.
Id.
See id. at 918.

Collective measures to safeguard the peoples of the world against threats to
peace and to reach just settlements of disputes among nations must be based
not only on international machinery to deal directly with disputes and to
prevent aggression, but also on economic cooperation among nations with the
object of preventing and removing economic and social maladjustments, of
achieving fairness and equity in economic relations between states, and raising
the level of economic well-being among peoples.
111.

Id.
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concerning the business cycle). 112 The concern, in short, encompassed
any economic force that could create tension between countries by
disrupting existing expectations and pitting the economic prosperity
of one country against that of another.
The proposals concerning business cycles are of greatest interest
here because these proposals reflected the new ideology about the
nature of international cooperation and the maintenance of
employment. Two principles capture the point. First, each country
was to accept responsibility for maintaining employment at home.
Here the full force of the Keynesian revolution was reflected: "Each of
the signatory nations will take action designed to achieve and
maintain full employment within its own jurisdiction, through
measures appropriate to its own political and economic
institutions." 113 Although this responsibility for ensuring employment
does not explicitly draw on principles for manipulating aggregate
demand, and thus does not advert explicitly to the new possibilities
for governmental programs intend to correct downturns in the
business cycle, the invocation to "take action" rings with the
possibility that governments can play an active role in dealing with
business cycles.
The Keynesian overtones of this first principle were fully
supported in the second principle: "No nation will seek to maintain
employment through measures which are likely to create
unemployment in other countries or which are incompatible with
international undertakings designed to promote an expanding volume
of international trade and investment in accordance with comparative
efficiencies of production."1' 14 The collective message of the two
provisions is clear: under the Proposals, each country would maintain
employment but not by measures that would increase unemployment
abroad. Employment would be maintained by aggregate policies that
stimulate the economy, not by policies that create jobs at the expense
of another country.
Here is the ideological shift against tariff and non-tariff barriers
that was the most important element of the post-War equation-the
shift from the use of trade restrictions as a means of preserving jobs
to putting the obligation on countries to create jobs by other means.
The idea that governments could control unemployment by explicit
macroeconomic policy provided the explicit backdrop of liberal
trade. 115 Tariff policy lost its legitimacy, in part, because its rationale

112.
113.
114.
115.

See id. at 916-18.
Id. at 919.
Id.
As one commentator said close to that time:

932

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37897

as a mechanism to preserve jobs was destroyed by the Keynesian
revolution. The policy tool of protectionism was no longer a necessary
tool of job creation and was therefore no longer a sufficient basis for
inflicting economic harm on people in another country.
With the publication of the Proposals, the free-trade paradigm
that informed the post-War negotiations over international economic
cooperation was now complete. Domestic policies that hurt the
prosperity of other countries would be subject to negotiations because
each country needed to have a forum in which the harmful policies of
other countries could be challenged. Joint prosperity was to be
preserved by asking each nation to use its macroeconomic policy tools
to maintain full employment without seeking to rely on measures
116
that would create jobs at the expense of people in other countries.
The rest flowed from this paradigm. Succeeding international
conferences endorsed this paradigm-and it became fully reflected in

It must be recognized that the reestablishment and the survival of
liberal trade policies will depend upon the ability of nations to achieve
and maintain high and stable levels of employment and upon their
willingness to afford to the producers of staple commodities some
measure of protection against the sudden impact of violent change.
WILCOX, TRADE CHARTER, supra note 4, at 19-20.
116.
The distributive aspects of the Proposals are also noteworthy. Although
this agenda was driven in part by the importance of an efficient economic system and
the search for global prosperity, efficiency was not the only value underlying the
proposals. In particular, the proposals recognized the value of social stability and
existing expectations-values that would also be protected through the international
system. UNITED STATES PROPOSALS, supra note 105, at 917. Most notably, the Proposal
contemplated that the world system would deal with situations in which "[tihere is
suddenly too much of some commodities and prices react accordingly. Many countries
learned after the last war that such changes can be devastating." Id. Although
acknowledging that the market should deal with most such occasions, moderation was
sometimes in order: "But if the changes come too fast they may bring serious distress to
many small producers and to their own communities. It is important that the needed
changes be made gradually." Id. The Proposals accordingly recognized that "it may be
necessary to restrict production or exports, to fix prices, or to allocate shares of markets
among producing countries"-subject to tight controls on their use and longevity. Id.
Under this view, collective action to control markets was sometimes better than either
a purely free market solution or the unilateral action that would inevitably accompany
such disruptions. The Proposals encapsulate the essence of the "embedded liberalism"
that made up the post-War ethic. See John Ruggie, International Regimes,
Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36
INT'L ORG. 379, 399 (1982).
[G]overnments . . . would seek to encourage an international division of labor
which, while multilateral in form and reflecting some notion of comparative
advantage (and therefore gains from trade), also promised to minimize socially
disruptive domestic adjustment costs as well as any national economic and
political vulnerabilities that might accrue from international functional
differentiation.
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the rules adopted to govern the trading system (that is, the General
Agreement itself), in the draft of the Charter for the new
International Trade Organization (ITO), and in GATT as it emerged
as an organization designed to take the place of the ITO.

V. CONCLUSION

If history is to be the guide, the WTO should not be understood
in narrow economic terms-i.e., simply as an organization that was
established to bring the fruits of free trade to consumers. The WTO
does that, but economic benefits alone were not the benefits sought by
those who established the WTO's predecessor, GATT. Instead, GATT
was established on the ground that policies made in one country often
adversely affect people in other countries who, in the absence of any
institutional framework, have no ability to influence those policies.
GATT was established to provide a forum in which one member
country would challenge the economic policies of another country.
This is an intensely political purpose.
To be sure, the metaphors that provided ideological support for
the foundation of GATT-the metaphors of beggar-thy-neighbor
policies and economic warfare-grew out of the particular experiences
of the Great Depression and World War II, but they contained a truth
that is the central kernel of internationalism in general and that is
undiminished by time: that policy made in one country often has
effects on people in another country. Whenever such cross-border
effects of policy-making and lawmaking occur, they create tensions.
They challenge the value systems of the people involved and the ideal
of participatory decision-making. It is a credit to the wisdom of the
leaders who oversaw the development of the post-War international
architecture that they recognized the importance of creating
international institutions to address these value-laden tensions and
allow participation across borders.
This recognition of the need for international institutions that
allow governments to represent the interests of their people in the
policy decisions made by other governments does not, of course, settle
any debate about the domain or scope of the WTO. By itself, this
notion does not help us determine whether and how to incorporate
issues relating to human rights or labor rights into the WTO. It does
suggest, however, that the essential domain of the WTO is not about
subject matter but rather about process. Our understanding of the
legitimacy of the WTO can therefore begin with an understanding
that the process set up through the mechanisms of the WTO to allow
values and interests to be represented across borders is an essentially
democracy-enhancing process. It suggests that as one searches for a
definition of the scope and reach of the WTO's power, one ought to
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keep in mind that the WTO offers the advantage of process that
might fruitfully be used whenever national differences over policy
have cross-border effects. The lesson of history is that those who
established the institutional framework within which the WTO now
operates understood that process matters because the WTO holds
domain over essentially political, not economic, issues.

